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AN EXPGRIMGNT ON RISK "fAKING AND EVALUATION PERIODS
Abslracl
We test whether the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influences their investment
in risky assets. Our results show that the more frequendy retums are evaluated, the more risk averse
investors will be. Thc results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of 'myopic loss aversion'
[Benartzi and Thaler 1995], which defines preferences over changes in wealth, and assumes that
people are more sensitive to losses than to gains. The results have relevance for the equity premium
puzzle, and also for [he marketing strategies of fund managers.
l. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Benartzi and Thaler [1995] put forward an explanation for the equity premium puzzle.
This puzzle refers to the fact that over the last century the risk-return relationship has been so much
more favorable for stocks than for bonds, that unreasonably high levels of risk aversion would be
needed to explain why investors are willing to hold bonds at all [Mehra and Prescott 1985]. The
explanation for this puzzle, advanced by Benartzi and Thaler, is called myopic loss aversion (MLA),
and rests on the combination of two behavioral concepts. The first concept is loss aversion [Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992]. It refers to the tcndency of individuals to
weigh losses more heavily than gains. The second concept is mental accounlíng [Kahneman and
Tversky 1984; Thaler 1985]. It refers to the implicit methods people employ to code and evaluate
financial outcomes.
The effect of combining these two concepts is perhaps best illustrated by means of a well-
known problem devised by Samuelson [1963]. Samuelson asked a colleague whether he would be
willing to accept a gamble in which there are equal chances to win á200 and to lose SI00. The
colleague declined this single gamble, but at the same time expressed a willingness to accept
multiple plays of the gamble. Although such a preference may have much intuitive appeal,
Samuelson provcd a theorem, saying that if the single gamble is rejected at every relevant wealth
position, then accepting the multiple gamble is inconsistent with expected utility maximization (see
Tversky and Bar-Hillel 1983 for further discussion).
Benartzi and Thaler show that rejecting each single gamble, but accepting a sequence of
such gambles is consistent with MLA (see Kahneman and Lovallo 1993 for a similar
argument). If
returns are evaluated over a longer period of time, multiple gambles become more
attractive due to
the lower probability that a loss will be experienced. 'fo illustrate, suppose
that the individual is
characterized by loss aversion and has a utiliry function u(z~z for z?0 and u(z)-2.Sz for z~0,
where
z is the change in wealth due to the gamble. Then, the expected utility of one
gamble is negative:
'fz(200) t'á(-250) ~ 0. Hence, the individual will reject one gamble, and also two gamblcs if each
is evaluated separately. The same individual, however, accepts two gambles if (s)he evaluates them
in combination: 'k(400) t'á(100) t'k(-500) ~ 0. Hence, rejecting a single gamble while accepting
two gambles is quite easily explained by the combined hypotheses of individuals being more
sensitive to losses than to gains and evaluating the outcomes of the sequence of gambles in
combination.
As the example illustrates, MLA predicts that the dynamic aggregation rules which people
employ influence their attitude towards risk. In particular, the period over which individuals evaluate
financial outcomes influences their investments in risky assets. By means of theoretical simulations,
Benartzi and Thaler show that MLA could thus provide an explanation for the equity premium
puzzle. (n particular, they show that the size of the equity premium is consistent with investors
evaluating their portfolios annually and weighing losses about 2.5 times as large as gains.
However, neither Benartzi and Thaler nor others have presented direct experimental evidence
for the presence of MLA. The evidence presented in Benartzi and Thaler is only circumstantial.
Hence, on one hand, we seem to have a choice anomaly - that is, a choice rule that departs from
standard theory - that could potentially explain an important phenomenon. On the other hand, there
are no direct and controlled tests which indicate that the anomaly is real. Designing such a test is
the purpose of the present paper.
We have expcrimental subjects making a sequence of risky choices. To analyze the presence
of MLA, we do not try to estimate the period over which subjects evaluate tinancial outcomes, but
rather we try to manipulate this evaluation period. In our set-up, two groups of participants are
subjected to the same sequence of choices. Subjects in the first (high frequency) group are supplied
with feedback information after each round of the sequence, and can change their choice after each
round. The subjec[s in the second (low frequency) group, however, get feedback information only
after three rounds, and can only adapt their choices after three rounds. If our design is successful
in manipulating subjects' evaluation period, MLA would predict the low frequency subjects to make
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more risky choices. If subjects use a longer horizon to evaluate outcomes, the trade-off between
losses and gains becomes more favorable for the risky option. At the same time, subjective expected
utility theory (SEU) does not predict any systematic difference in risk taking between the two
treatments in our set-up.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section explains and motivates
the design of the experimental test, and spells out the hypothesis. Section 3 presents the results, and
Section 4 concludes.
I[. DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Consider an individual who is confronted with a sequence of 3 independent but identical lotteries,
in which there is a probability of 2~3 to lose ál and a probability of Il3 to win 52.5. If, as is
hypothesized by MLA, the individual weighs losses more heavily than gains, then the attractiveness
of the lotteries may depend on whether the financial consequences of the gambles are evaluated
separately or in combination. For illustration, suppose that the individual weighs losses relative to
gains at a rate of 111. Then the expected utility of a single lottery is (2l3)~(-I) t(II3x2.5), which
is positive only if ~.~1.25. If, however, a subject evaluates the three lotteries in combination, then
the expected utility is (II27x7.5) t(6127x4) t(12I27x0.5) t(S127)~.(-3), which is positive if
~~1.56. This is because the probability of a Ioss decreases from 0.67 for a single lottery, to
(0.67)'-0.30 for three consecutive lotteries. If the financial consequences of the three lotteries are
evaluated in combination rather than separately, then the lotteries should become more attractive.'
It is this basic prediction of MLA that we tested in our experiment, by manipulating the evaluation
period of subjects.
' This prediction only depends on losses weighing more heavy than gains, and not on [he utility function
being piece-wise linear.
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In the experiment, subjects were confronted with a sequence of 12 identical but independent
rounds of a lottery (betting game). In each of the first 9 rounds ("part I" of the experiment), subjects
were endowed with 200 cents.' They had to decide which part (X,) of this endowment they wanted
to bet in the lottery (05X,~20Q t-1,..,9). In the lottery there was a probability of 2l3 to lose the
amount bet and a probability of Il3 to win two and half times the amount bet. It is important to
stress that subjects could not bet any money accumulated in previous rounds. Hence, the maximum
bet in each round is 200 cents, independently of the outcome of the bet in any of the previous
rounds. In the rounds 10-12 ("part 2" of the experiment) subjects were no longer endowed with any
additional money from the experimenters. Rather, they had to make bets from the money eatned in
part I. To that purpose a subject's earnings in the nine rounds of part I were fitst totalled and then
divided by three. Thc resulting amount was a subject's endowment (S) for each of the three rounds
of part 2. Again, for each round, a subject had to decide which part (X,) of the endowment S to bet
in the lottery (05X,5S, t-10,1 1,12).
The crucial feature of the design is that there were two different treatments: Treatment H
(high frequency) and Treatment L(low frequency). In Treatment H, the subjects played the rounds
one by one. At the beginning of round I they had to chuose how much of their endowment of 200
cents to bet in the lottery. Then they were informed about the reali7ation of thc lottery in round I.
Only then they decided how much of their new endowment of 200 cents to bet for round 2, and so
on. Hence, in this treatment subjects made nine betting decisions in part I and three decisions in part
2. in Treatment L, however, subjcc[s played the rounds in blocks of three. At the beginning of round
I, subjects had to decide how much of their endowment of 200 cent to bet in the lotteries of rounds
l, 2 and 3. In addition, these bets were restricted to be equal. If a subject bet X in round I, then
(s)he also bet X in rounds 2 and 3(that is, X,-Xi Xi, with 05X,~00). After subjects decided on
their bets, they were inforrned about the combined realization for rounds l, 2, and 3. That is, they
could not assign a gain or loss to any particular round, but only knew the aggregate result.
' At the time of the experiment I guilder (100 cents) exchanged for about
USS0.60.
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Subsequently, subjects decided how much to bet in round 4, 5, and 6, and so on. Hence, in
Treatment L, subjects make three decisions ín part I, and one decision in part 2.
In Treatment L, subjects chose their bet for the next three rounds, hence, they had less
freedom because they could not change their decision after every round. In particular, by design of
Treatment L we have X,-X,,,-X,.,, for t-1,4,7,10. In Treatmen[ H these equalities need not hold.
Furthermore, the subjects in Treatment H were supplied with more information than the subjects in
Treatment L. When deciding on X„ a subject in Treahnent H was always fully informed about the
realizations and corresponding eamings of the previous rounds. A subject in Treatment L, however,
simultaneously decided about X,, X,,,, and X,., (t-1,4,7,10). A subject had to decide about X,,, (X„z)
without knowing the realization for round t(rounds t and t}I). Hence, in Treatment L subjects were
supplied with less freedom and less information than in T'reatment H.
The basic idea behind [he two treatments of our design is to manipulate the evaluation
period. ln Treatment L, the frequency of choice and information feedback was lower than in
Treatment H. As a result, we can expect the subjects in Treatment L to evaluate the financial
consequences of betting in a more aggregated way. If the subjects are characterized by MLA, this
should make them more apt to bet money in the lotteries.'
Subjective expected utility maximization ( SEU) predicts no systematic difference between
the two treatments. SEU assumes that subjects are interested in the probability distribution over final
wealth positions at the end of the experiment. Since every betting strategy that is available in
Treatment L is also available in Treatment H, subjects in Treatment L do not face a more favorable
distribution over final outcomes. If the risk attitudes of subjects depends on their wealth levels, then
SEU allows for differences between the two treatments. In the second and third round of each block
' In principle, it would be possible to draw conclusions from only part 1 of thc experiment. flowevcr,
since the subjects receive the 200 cents endowment from us, it is possible [hat they do not experience a lost
bet as a"real" loss. In pan 2 of the experiment subjects bet their own money, "eamed" in part
I. Therefore,
we expect that the impact of loss aversion (if at all) would be amplified in part 2. On the other hand, in part




of three rounds, subjects in Treatment H have more information about their curcent wealth levels
than the subjects in Treatment L. Since bets may be contingent on curtent wealth levels, these bets
may differ. However, curcent wealth levels do not systematically differ between the two treatments,
and hence SEU predicts no systematic difference. Therefore, we take "No systematic difference
between the two treatment" as our null hypothesis.
Procedure
We had fourteen experimental sessions, seven for each of the two treatments. The experiment was
administrated by pen and paper, and held in a seminar room with subjects seated far apart. Six
different subjects participated in each session (that is 84 subjects in total)." Students were recruited
from Tilburg University. An announcement in the university bulletin solicited participants for a
decision-making experiment of about 40 minutes, with a reward which would depend on their
decisions, but which was likely to be somewhere between 5 and 35 Dutch guilders. For each session
8 subjects were invited; 6 to participate in the betting games, 1 as an assistant, and 1 spare for cases
of no-show.
Upon entering the room, a short standard-type introduction was read to the subjects by the
experimenter. Subjects were informed that the experiment would consist of three parts, but that they
would be infonned about the instructions of part 2 only after part I would be finished. After the
introduction, each subject drew an envelope out of a stack. Six envelopes contained numbered
registration forms for part 1 of the experiment; one envelopc contained a note with 'assistant', and
one had an empty note (the latter envelop was removed when only 7 subjects showed up). The
assistant was told that he would receive a payment equal to the average eamings of the other
participants. The subject who drew the empty note was paid f 10 for showing up and was asked to
leave the room.
' As it tumed ou[, we had one subject who was in the experiment twice. We delete his second set
of
choices from the data, leaving us with 41 observations in Treatment H.
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Instructions (in Dutch) for part I were distribu[ed and read aloud. ARer that, subjects could
examine the instructions for a few additional minutes, and (privately) ask questions.
Subjects were then asked [o record their first bets. The lottery was conduc[ed by the
assistant. To determine whether a subject gained or lost it~ a round's lottery, we used private 'win-
letters' which were indicated on the registration form. For subjects I and 2 the win-letter was A,
for subjects 3 and 4 it was B, and for subjects 5 and 6 the win-letter was C. The purpose of having
different win-letters, was to have more variation in the rcaliz~ntion of gains and losses. The assistant
used a box containing three disks marked A, B, and C, respectively. After the subjects had recorded
their bets for the mund, the assistant first showed the contents of the box to the subjects (to show
that the box contained an A, B and C), then shook the box, and randomly took one disk out of the
box. The letter on the disk was the so-called round-letter for the round. If a subject's private win-
letter matched the round-letter, (s)he won in the lottery; if the Ietters did not match, (s)he lost. Since
there were three letters in the box, only one of which matched a subject's win-letter the probability
to win in any round's lottery was ll3 and the probability to lose was 213.
In Treatment L, the subjects fixed bets for three rounds, and three lotteries were conducted
by the Assistant. To that purpose, the assistant used three boxes, each containing 3 disks labeled A,
B, and C. The assistant firs[ showed the contents of each box to the subjects (to show that each box
contained an A, B and C), then shook the boxes, and randomly took one disk out of each box. Then
the three disks drawn were shown simultaneously to the subjects.' The letters on the three disks
drawn were the round-letters for the present three rounds.
After each round (three rounds in Treatment L), subjects calculated and recorded their own
eatnings on their registration form. We checked these calculations to make sure that they understood
the procedure, and that they didn't cheat. Then subjects recorded their bets for the next round (next
' The main purpose of our design is to manipulate the evaluation period of the subjects in Treatment L.
We wanted them to evaluate three consecutive lotteries in an aggregated way, without experiencing the losses
and gains of each separate lottery. Therefore, the outcome of the three lotteries were shown to them
simultaneously. In this way it was not possible for them to attribute a gain or a loss to any particular round
in the ólock of three.
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three rounds in Treatmen[ L).
At the end of the nine rounds, total eamings were calcula[ed and forms were collected. The
experimenter divided these total earnings by three to determine the starting endowment (maximum
bet) for each of the three rounds of part 2. This starting endowment (S) was indicated on top of the
registration form for part 2. These forms were distributed together with the instructions for part 2.
The instructions were read aloud, and then the three betting rounds for part 2 were held. Again,
subjects calculated thcir own eamings. After it was finished, all subjects were paid 6 The assistant
was paid the average eamings of the other subjects. That concluded the experiment.
III. IZESULTS
Analyzing the results of part 1 is a straightforward exercise. We simply compare the average
percentage of the endowment (of 200 cents) bet in the lottery for the two treatments. To ease
comparison, we take the average percentage of endowment bet in blocks of three rounds. These
averages and the corresponding slandard dcviations (across individuals) are presented in Table I. The
final row of Table I gives the average percentage of endowment bet over all rounds.
' In fact, after part 2 was finished there was a short supplementary part in the experiment. In this part we
tried to obtain additional information about subjects' risk preferences. This part, however, is not directty








Averagc percentage of endowmcnt bet (part I)
Treatment 1 i' Treatment L'
52.0 (30.2) 66.7 (29.5)
44.8 (30.0) 63.7 (30.3)






50.5 (26.7) 67.4 (27.3) -2.86 [0.002]
Notes: ' Nobs. - 41 (42) for trcatmcnt H(L). Standard deviations between parcntheses Q. ' One-tailed
significance levels (p.values) between brackets (J.
The results display a clear treatment effect. In each round average bets are larger for
treatment L than for treatment H. To determine the significance of the differences, we use the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test.' The final column reports z-values, which are a transformation of
the Mann-Whitney U-value corrected for the presence of ties. These z-values are asymptotically
notmally distributed. The corresponding one-tailed significance levels are also reported.' The results
indicate that the difference in average bets is highly significant.
It appears, moreover, that the levels of the bets are fairly stable over the rounds. Although
for both treatments bets are somewhat lower in the three middle rounds, there is no clear or
significant pattem in the data. It is particularly noticeable that the difference between the two
treatments is significant already in the first block of three rounds. It seems that the design is
' We cannot use the parametric t-test. This test assumes [he observa[ions to come from a normal
distribution, which is not possible giving the lower- and upper-bound of 0 and 100, respectively. Also, a
Kolmogorov-Smimov test rejects the hypothesis that the observations are from a nortnal distribution.
' We report one-tailed significance levels because the null hypothesis (SEU) predicts no systematic
difference, whereas the altemative hypothesis (MLA) predicts the bets in Treatment L to be larger.
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effective in changing subjects' attitude towards risk right from the start of the experiment, that is,
without subjects having any experience with the occurrence of gains and losses. This would suggest
that subjects are, at least to a substantial extent, forward looking when evaluating ( "mentally
accounting") risky decisions.
In part 2, subjects' endowments were again identical across rounds, but contrary to part I,
they differed across individuals. In each of the three rounds, a subject's endowment was equal to
Il3 of his or her total eamings (W) from part I of the experiment (S - Wl3). As a consequence, for
each subject we have two variables of interest: first, the absolute amount bet, Y:- E;Z,aX, (SW),
where for Treatment L we have X,óX„-X,:, and, second, the percentage of the endowment bet in
the lottery, F:- 100Y1W. The averages of both variables are presented in the first two rows of Table
lI.
TABLE 11




Treatment H' Treatment L' : Mann-Whitney zb
707.3 (614.5) : 887.1 (662.1) : -2.14 [0.016]
39.0 (30.0) 48.9 (32.1) -1.62 [0.053]
1822 (1015) . 2134 (745) -1.78 (0.038]
Notes: '~obs. - 41 (42) (or treatment tl (Ly titandard deviations between tw'enttteses Q-' One-tailed
significance levels (p-valtxs) betwmn brackets 11.
It appears that the treatment effect is in the same direction as in part 1. On average, subjects
in Treatment L bet more in the risky lottery. Both in absolute and relative terms, bets were larger
if subjects were supplied with less information feedback and less freedom of choice. For the amount
10
bet (Y) the diftèrence is again highly significant. For the percentage of endowment bet (Y) the
difference between the two treatments is less pronounced but still (marginall significant. As the
~
final row of Table 11 indicates, the increased willingness to take risks also pays ofi. Total eamings
of the subjects in Treatment L are significantly larger than in Treatment H.
1V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a direct experimental test of the prediction of myopic loss aversion (MLA), that
a longer evaluation period makes a risky option with positive expected retum look more attractive.
Our results strongly support this prediction. We manipulated the evaluation period of one group of
experimental subjects by giving them less inforrnation feedback and less freedom of adjustment than
a control group. This manipulation was intended to make subjects evaluate risky financial
investments in a more aggregated way, as a consequence of which they are less likely to be deterred
by the occurrence of losses. In particular, we observe higher eamings for the subjects who evaluate
their investment in a more aggregate way. The results provide support for Benartzi and Thaler's
[1995] explanation of the equity premium pu~zle.
The results may also have practical relevance. Manipulating the evaluation period of
prospective clients, could be a useful marketing strategy for fund managers. Our results suggest that
providing investors with less frequent information feedback about how a particular risky fund is
doing, might make the fund appear more attractive, by decreasing the likelihood that a loss will be
experienced. Similarly, giving investors less freedom of adjustment ('tying their hands'), may induce
them to evaluate financial outcomcs in a more aggregated way, and help them to resist the
temptation to step out after the occasional backdrop.
Of course, our experiment is very styliud. For example, the subjects in the experiment only
face risk (known probabilities of possible outcomes), whereas real-life investors mainly deal with
uncertainty (unknown probabilities). Another issue is that our experiment took less than an hour,
whereas the time elapsing between real investment decisions usually is much longer. Furthermore,
the financial stakes for the experimental subjects are low compared to those of most real world
decision-makers. 'tliese features urge for modesty when extrapolating the results. They also suggest
lines along which to pursue further experimental work.
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APPENDIX. INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMS
(translated from Dutch)
Introduction [Read aloud]
1 welcome you to our experimen[al study of decisionmaking. The experiment will last about 40 minutes.
The instructions for the experiment are simple and if you follow them carefully you can earn a consider-
able amount of money. All the money you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you, privately and in
cash, immediately after the experiment.
The experiment will consist of three parts. The instructions for the second part will be distributed
to you after the first part has been finished. The instructions for part 3 will be announced at the
completion of part 2. Before we start the experiment, however, you will be asked to pick one envelope
from this pile. In the envelope you will find your, socalled, Registration Form. This form will be used to
register your decisions and eamings. One of you, however, will find the announcement 'assistant' in the
envelope. This person will assist us during the experiment, and will receive a payment which is equal to
the average earnings of the other participants in the experiment.
On [op of your Registration Form you will find your registration number. This number indicates
behind which table you are to take a seat. A separate table is reserved for the assistant. When everyone is
seated we will go through the instructions of part l of the experiment. After that you will get the
opportunity to study the instructions on your own, and to ask questions. If you have a question, please
raise your hand and I will come to your table. It is not allowed to talk or to communicate with the other
participants during the experiment.
Are there any question, about what has been said up till now? If not, then [he person on the leR
of ine is now requested to first pick an envelope, open it and take the corresponding seat.
[Treatment H; Read aloud and distributed)
Instructions for part I
Part I of the experiment consists of 9 succesive rounds. In each round you will start with an amount of
200 cents (f2). You must decide which part of this amount (between 0 cents and 200 cents) you wish to
bet in the following lottery.
You have a chance of 2l3 (67"~0) to lose the amount you be[ and a chance of Il3 (33"~) to win
[wo and a half times the amount you be[.
You are requested to record your choice on your Registration Form. Suppose you decide to be[ an amount
of X cents (OSX~00) in the lot[ery. Then you must fill in the amount X in the column headed Amount in
louery, in [he row with the number of the present round.
Whether you win or lose in the lottery partly depends on your personal win letter. This letter is
índicated on top of your Registration form. Your win letter can be A, B or C, and is the same for all 9
rounds. In any round you win in tlte lottery if your win letter matches the round letter that will be drawn
by the assistant, and you lose if your win letter dces not match the round letter.
The round letter is determined as follows. After you have recorded your bet in the lottery for the
round, the assistant will, in a random manner, pick one letter from a box containing three letters: A, B,
and C. The letter drawn is the round letter for that round. If the round letter matches your win letter you
win in the lottery; otherwise you lose. Since there are three letters, one of which matches your win letter,
the chance of winning in the lottery is Il3 (33"~) and the chance of losing is 2l3 (67"~0).
Hence, your eamings in the lottery are determined as follows. If you have decided to put an
amount of X cents in the lottery, then your eamings in the lottery for the round are equal to -X if the
round letter dces not match your win letter (you lose the amount bet) and equal to t2.5X if the round
letter matches your win letter (you win two and a half times the amount bet).
The round letter will be shown to you by the assistant. You are requested to record this letter in
the column Round letters, under win ar (ose, depending on whether the round letter does or dces not
match your win letter. Also you are requested to record your eamings in the lottery in the column
Earnings in lottery. Your total earnings for the round are equal to 200 cents (your starting amoun[) plus
your earnings in the lottery. These eamings are recorded in the column Totol earnings, in the row of the
cortesponding round. Each time we will come by to check your Registration Form.
After that you are requested to record your choice for the next round. Again you start with an
amount of 200 cents, a part of which you can bet in [he lottery. The same procedure as described above
determines your eamings for this round. It is noted that your private win letter remains the same, but that
for each round a new round letter is drawn by the assistant. All subsequent rounds will also procede in
the same manner. After the last round has been completed, your eamings in all rounds will be added. This
amount determines your total eamings for part 1 of the experiment. Then the instructions for part 2 of the
experiment will be announced.
[Treatmen[ H]
Your registration number: Your win letter:























[Treatment H; Read aloud and distributed~
Ins[ructions for part 2
Part 2 of the experiment is almost identical to part I, but differs in two respec[s. First, part 2 consists of 3
rounds (instead of 9 rounds). Second, in part 2 you do not get any additional starting amount from us.
You play with the money that you have earned in part I. T'o that purpose, we first divide your earnings in
part I by three. The resulting amoun[ is your sturrrng umount .S for each of the three rounds. Again you
are asked which part of this amount (between 0 and 5) you wish to bet in the lottery.
You have a chance ul 2~3 (67~) to lose the amount you bet and a chance uf U3 (33 ~) to win
two and a half times the amount you bet.
You are asked to record your choice on the Registration Form. Suppose you decide to bet an amoun[ of X
cents (OSXSS), [hen you must fill in [he amount X under Amount in lotrery.
Your private win lettcr is the same as in part I and can be found on top of your Registration
From. After you have recorded your bet for the present round, the assistant will again, in a random
manner, pick one letter from a box containing three letters: A, B, and C. The letter drawn is the round
letter. If this round letter matches your win letter you win in the lottery, otherwise you lose.
If you have decided to bet an amount X in the lottery, then your earnings in the lottery are equal
to -X if the round letter dces not match your win letter (you lose the amount bet for the round) and equal
to t2.5X if the round letter does match your win letter (you win two and a half times the amount bet for
the round).
You are again requested to record the round letter and your earnings in the lottery on the
Registration Forrn. Your total eamings for the round are equal to your starting amount S plus your
earnings in the lottery. Your are asked to record these on your Registration Form. We will come by to
check your form.
ARer that you are requested to make your choice for the next round. Again you can choose to bet
part of your starting amount ín the lottery. The same procedure as described above deterrnines your
eamings. Round 3 will procede in the same manner. After that, your eamings in the three rounds will be
added. This amount determines your total eamings in part 1 and 2 of the experiment. Then the instruc-
tions for part 3 will be announced.
Your registra[ionnumber. Your win let[er:
Your starting amount S in each round
(earnings in part I devided by three):


















~Trcatmcnt L; Rcad aluud and distributed]
Instructions for part 1
Part I of the experiment consists of 9 succesive rounds. In each round you will stan with an amount of
Z00 cen[s (J2). You mus[ decide which part of this amount ( be[ween 0 cents and 200 cents) you wish to
bet in the following lottery.
You have a chance of 2l3 (67~0) to lose the amount you bet and a ehance of Il3 (33oI) to win
[wo and a half times the amount you bet.
You are requested to record your choice on your Registration Fortn. Suppose you decide to bet an amount
of X cents (OSX5200) in the lottery. Then you must fill in the amoun[ X in the column headed Amount in
lottery. Please note that you fix your choice for the next three rounds. If you decide to bet an amount X
in the lottery for round I, then you also bet an amount X in the lottery for rounds 2 and 3. Therefore,
three consecutive rounds are joined together on the Registration From.
Whether you win or lose in the lottery partly depends on your personal win letter. This letter is
indicated on top of your Registration fotm. Your win letter can be A, B or C, and is the same for all 9
rounds. In any round you win in the lottery if your win Ietter matches the round leuer that will be drawn
by the assistant, and you lose if your win let[er does not match the round letter.
The round letter is determined as follows. After you have recorded your bet in the lottery for the
next three rounds, the assistant will, in a random manner, for cach of the next three rounds pick one letter
from a box con[aining thrce letters: A, B, and C. For each of the three rounds a letter is drawn from a
differen[ box. The three letters drawn are the round letters for the present three rounds. If the round letter
matches your win letter you win in the lottery; otherwise you lose. Since each box con[ains three letter,
one of which matches your win letter,the chance of winning in the lottery in a round is Il3 (33"~) and
the chance of losing is 2l3 (67"~0).
Hence, your earnings in the lottery for the three rounds are deterrnined as follows. If you have
decided to put an amount of X cents in the lottery, then your eamings in the lottery are equal to -X for
each round letter that does not match your win letter (you lose the amount bet for the round) and equal to
t2.5X for each round letter that matches your win letter (you win two and a half times the amount bet for
the round).
The [hree round letters will be shown to you by the assistant. You are requested to record these
letters in the column Round letters, under win or lase, depending on whether the round letter does or does
not match your win lettec You are also requested to record your eamings in the lottery in the column
Earnings in lottery. Your total earnings for [he three rounds are equal to 600 cen[s (three times your
starting amount of 200 cent) plus your eamings in [he lottery. These eamings are recorded in the column
Total earnings, in the row of the corresponding rounds. Each [ime we will come by to check your
Registration Form.
After that you are reques[ed to record your choice for the next three rounds (4-6). For each of the
three rounds you again start with an amount of 200 cents, a part of which you can bet in thc lottery. The
same procedure as described above de[ermines your eamings for these three rounds. It is noted Ihat your
private win letter remains the same, but that for each round a new round letter is drawn by the assistant.
The subsequen[ three rounds (7-9) will also procede in the same manner. After the last round has been
completed, your eamings in all rounds will be added. This amount determines your total eamings for part
I of the experiment. Then the ins[ructions for part 2 of the experiment will be announced.
(Treatment l.]
Your registrationnumber: Your win-lelter:









-X for each lose;







[Treatment L; Read aloud and distributed~
Instructions for part 2
Part 2 of the experiment is almost identical to part 1, but differs in two respects. First, part 2 consists of 3
rounds (instead of 9 rounds). Second, in part 2 you do not get any additional starting amount from us.
You play with the money that you have eamed in part I. To that purpose, we first divide your earnings in
part I by three. The resulting amount is your slarting amounr S for each of [he three rounds. Again you
are asked which part of this amount (between 0 and S) you wish to bet in the lottery.
You have a chance of 2l3 (67"~ ) to lose the amount you bet and a chance of I l3 (33"~) to win
two and a half times the amount you bet.
You are asked to record your choice on the Registration Fortn. Suppose you decide to bet an amount of X
cents (OS?C5S), then you must fill in [he amount X under Amount in lottery. Please note that you fix your
choice for all three rounds. If you decide to bet an amount of X cent in Ihe lottery for round I, then you
also bet the amount X in the lottery for round 2 and round 3.
Your private win letter is the same as in part 1 and can be found on top of your Registration
From. After you have recorded your bet for [he three rounds, the assistant will again, in a random manner,
for each round pick one letter from a box containing [hree letters: A, 6, and C. For each of the three
rounds a letter is drawn from a different box. The three letters drawn are [he round letters. If a round
letter matches your win letter you win in the lottery, otherwise you lose.
If you have decided to bet an amount X in the lottery, then your earnings in the lottery are equal
to -X for each round letler that does not match your win letter (you lose the amount bet for the round)
and equal to t2.5X for each round letter that dces match your win letter (you win two and a half times
the amoun[ bet for the round).
You are again requested to record the round letters and your eamings in the lottery on the
Registration Fortn. Yuur total eamings for [he three rounds are equal to three times your starting amount
S plus your eamings in the lottery for the three rounds. This amount determines your total earnings in part
I and 2 of the experiment. Then the instruc[ions for part 3 will be announced.
Your registrationnumber: Your win letter:
Your starting amount S in each round
(earnings in part 1 devided by three):
Registration Form (part 2)
[Treatment L)
Rounds Amoun( in Ruund letters Earnings Tolu!
lottery in lottery earnings
lose win
(OSXSS) -X for each lose; (3S t earnings in
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